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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts offered in appellee's brief requires
response because it is encumbered by inaccurate and irrelevant
details.
The appellee's "facts" are inaccurate in the following places:
1.

Concerning Mr. Irizarry's relationship with his current

wife, Patty Irizarry, Mr. Irizarrv began dating Patty in February
or March 1984 . . . .x Appellee's brief at 9.

This is a misstatement

of what Mr. Irizarry testified to regarding his relationship with
his current wife.

Mr. Irizarry testified that he began dating his

current wife seriously in February or March of 1984 and that he met
his current wife in October 1984. R.593.

Furthermore, by the time

Mr. Irizarry began seriously dating his current wife, approximately
four months after they had met in October 1984, they had made the
decision

to get married.

R.593-594.2

This

is a

significant

misstatement of the facts by appellee because the record clearly
indicates

that

Mr.

Irizarry's

and

his

current

wife's

dating

relationship began well before February or March of 1985 and in all
likelihood began when he met her in October 1984, while he was
supposedly making an effort to support his and Ms. Parker's unborn
children.
2.

. . .Mr.

Irizarrv began dating his current wife, Patty

x

This date reference is most likely a mistake by appellee.
The record indicates February or March 1985. (R.593).
2

0n direct examination, Mr. Irizarry testified that he and his
current wife did not talk about marriage until May of 1985.
(R.577).
However, on cross examination, Mr. Irizarry testified
that he and his current wife talked about getting married about
four months after they met which would coincide with the February
or March 1985 date when they began seriously dating.
(R.593).

Irizarry..., more than one month after Ms. Parker refused his help
for the second time and had made clear her desire that he stay out
of her life and the lives of the twins by tellincr him that under no
circumstances would she name the twins "Irizarry," and that she
intended to give the children her last name.

Appellee's brief at

9.
Appellants assume that this "fact" asserted by appellee refers
to Mr. Irizarry's version of a conversation he and Ms. Parker had
in January 1985.

This is a factual misstatement because appellee

has characterized rather than stated Mr. Irizarry's testimony and
this characterization has created what is no longer "fact, " but
argument.
Mr. Irizarry did not testify that Ms. Parker made specific
statements to him indicating that he was to stay out of the lives
of the twins.

Mr. Irizarry's testimony regarding that January

telephone conversation focused on his relationship with Ms. Parker.
In this regard, Mr. Irizarry testified that Ms. Parker stated she
did not want to have anything to do with him anymore.

R.572. Ms.

Parker's testimony regarding the name on the birth certificate was
that she seated to Mr. Irizarry that she was putting Parker as the
last name on the birth certificate because she was the one doing
all the work and she was not getting any support from Mr. Irizarry.
R.453.
3 . Concerning the communications between Mr. Irizarry and Ms.
Parker between September 1984 and June 1985, Mr. Irizarry testified
that on at least three occasions, in September 1984, in November
2

1984 and January 1985, Ms. Parker told him that she did not want
his financial help and wanted nothing to do with him.

Appellee's

brief at 7-8.
This is a misstatement

of Mr. Irizarry's testimony.

Mr.

Irizarry did not testify that on these three occasions in September
1984, November 1984 and January 1985 that Ms. Parker told him that
she did not want his financial help and wanted nothing to do with
him.
(1)

Regarding

the

September

communication, Mr.

Irizarry

testified as follows:
Q. What can you tell us about the conversation you had
in September?
A. She was very, very angry. I don't know if she took
the money as charity or what, but she was clearly angry
at me for sending money and she said not to send money
again. She would finish her degree and do it on her own.
That was pretty much -- she did actually receive the
check and that was the reason for my call. R.566.
There was no testimony indicating that Ms. Parker stated she did
not want his financial help and wanted nothing to do with him.3
As

a matter

of

fact,

notwithstanding

Irizarry concerning Ms. Parker's

the

speculation

feelings toward

of Mr.

the money he

testified he sent in September, it is clear from his testimony that
Ms. Parker did take the money.

This is a contraindication that Ms.

Parker did not want Mr. Irizarry's financial support.

3

Appellants submit that Mr. Irizarry's version of Ms. Parker's
alleged statement "to not send money again" should not be construed
as a statement of not wanting financial support since Mr.
Irizarry's version reflects Ms. Parker took the money.
3

(2)

Regarding

the

November

communication,

Mr.

Irizarry

testified:
Q.
Did you have any communication with her after you
sent the letter and the money in November?
A.

Follow up call to see if the money got there.

Q.

And what do you remember about that call?

A. Again, she was upset and she said she wouldn't want
anything to do with me in November after I said -- sent
money for the second time.
Q.
When you sent the money in November,
understand that she was going to accept it?
A.

did

you

Yes.

Q.
Had you talked about her accepting it in the early
November phone calls?
A.

No, I don't recall.

Q.

But you believe she would accept it in November?

A. She did accept it because I never got it back.
never sent it back. R.568-569.

She

There is nothing in this testimony that indicates that Ms. Parker
said she did not want Mr. Irizarry's financial support.
September

1984

communication

the

evidence

is

to

the

As in the
contrary

because Ms. Parker accepted the money that Mr. Irizarry testified
he sent.
(3)

Regarding

the

January

communication,

Mr.

Irizarry

testified:
Q. Did you have any conversation with her in January of
1985?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q. And what was that conversation?
or was it a letter?

4

Was it a phone call

A. I called her in January. After Christmas you think
about things and I said, "Well, Christmas time, let me
humble myself again and just call her to see what is up.
See how she is doing."
Q.

And I take it you did talk to her?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q. And tell us what you said and what she said in that
phone call.
A.
She told me that under no circumstances she would
name them "Irizarry." She wouldn't use "Irizarry" on the
birth certificates and that she wasn't going to name them
that. She would name them "Breanna and Brittany Parker."
Q. Had she had the Breanna and Brittany names picked out
yet?
A.
Pretty sure.
I am pretty sure.
It
recollection that, yes, that is what I recall.
Q.

is

my

Did she say anything else?

A. I asked her why because I was serious. What have I
done to you for you to react in such a way. So I asked
her why.
Q.

And what did she say?

A.

Same old line:

Q.

What was that?

"I just don't want anything."

A.
"I don't want to have
anymore." R.570-572.

to do anything with you

Again, there is nothing in this testimony that indicates that Ms.
Parker said that she did not want Mr. Irizarry's financial support.
Appellee would like the Court to "read between the lines" and
extrapolate as to what Ms. Parker meant by Mr. Irizarry's "version"
of the communications in each of these three months; however, this
would be clearly improper in light of Ms. Parker's direct testimony
that she never told Mr. Irizarry she did not want him to pay
5

support.

R.460.

Furthermore, Ms. Parker's testimony is bolstered

by Mr. Irizarry's admission that she accepted money on the two
occasions he sent it.

R.566, 569.

Appellants submit that at best

Mr. Irizarry's testimony only reflects the anger and frustration of
Ms.

Parker

concerning

their

relationship;

however,

it

is not

inconsistent with Ms. Parker's testimony that she never told Mr.
Irizarry that she did not want his support.
Finally,

appellee's

"facts" regarding

the brevity

of

the

relationship between Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry are irrelevant.
Appellee's brief at 7.

There is no issue of paternity in this case

R. 105-106, thus appellants

fail to see the relevance of these

factual details.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A response is needed to appellee's statement of the case,
wherein appellee gives a "history" concerning the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in this matter.

This "history" is

bolstered by the "personal knowledge" of Ms. Elisabeth Blattner,
counsel for the appellee.
First,
precedent

Appellee's brief at 2; 6.

it would be safe to say that

md

none

is cited by appellee

supplement a record in this way.

it is without
to allow

legal

a party

to

Secondly, the supposed necessity

for this "history" is to allow the Court to consider the State's
third point, which is that
the facts as found do not constitute equitable estoppel
as a defense to Mr. Irizarry's pre-filing support
obligation to his biological children.
Appellee's brief at 2, Appellants' brief at 43.
6

This alleged history is not needed for any consideration of
the appellants' point on this issue.

Appellants' argument is that

even if the findings made by the lower court are totally accepted
as not being clearly erroneous, they do not support a determination
that estoppel is an appropriate defense in this case.

Appellants

are not arguing that the lower court did not say enough in the
findings; appellants are arguing that what the lower court said
does not support a determination of estoppel.

Thus, the fact that

appellee wanted the lower court to say more and is willing to
supplement

the

record

with

unsworn

allegations

of

counsel

to

support additional findings is not only highly inappropriate but
totally irrelevant

to the Court's consideration of appellants'

point on this issue.
Appellee's

distorted

version

of

the

"facts"

and

his

unsubstantiated additions to the statement of the case are intended
to divert the Court's focus from the three determinations the State
seeks in this case:
(1) that the unique nature of paternity and child support
establishment cases does not give rise to circumstances
where equitable estoppel and laches are appropriate as
defenses to a biological father's support obligation; or
(2) even if the principles of equitable estoppel may be
applied in a paternity or child support case, the lower
court's finding in this case on the necessary element of
representation made by Ms. Parker are clearly erroneous;
or

(3) even
if the
lower court's
finding
on the
representation element of equitable estoppel is not
clearly erroneous, the facts found do not support a
finding of equitable estoppel as a defense to Mr.
Irizarry's prefiling support obligation to his biological
children.
7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT CAN DETERMINE THAT EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS NOT
AVAILABLE AS A DEFENSE TO A BIOLOGICAL FATHER'S SUPPORT
OBLIGATION.
The appellee contends that since appellants did not raise this
issue at the lower court level appellants should not be allowed to
argue

that

the

unpublished

precursor

decision

to

Burrow

v.

Vrontikis, 788 P. 2d 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) should not be used as
precedent

in

this

case.

Clearly,

at

the

lower

court

level,

appellants could not make a good faith argument to the district
court that the defense of estoppel is not available because the
published

Vrontikis

decision,

defense is available.
overrule

this

erroneous.

aspect

Vrontikis

II,

implies

that

the

Unlike the lower court, this Court can
of

Vrontikis

II

because

it

is

clearly

State v. Menzies, No. 880161, slip op. at 6 n. 3 (Utah

March 29, 1994) .

This Court also can choose not to consider

Vrontikis II of precedential authority based upon the fact that its
reasoning is set forth in an unpublished decision, Vrontikis I.
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1991); Paffel v. Paffel,
732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986).
It is also the appellants' position that the Utah Supreme
Court case of Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144

(Utah 1987) is

distinguishable and thus is not determinative of the issue before
this Court.

Borland was a paternity action, but, the issue was

whether laches should be a bar to prosecution of the paternit^
action brought against the father.
8

Id. at 144.

While the Court

did hold that generally equitable defenses could be applied to
actions at law, it did not specifically consider whether equitable
estoppel can ever be asserted by a biological father to defeat his
obligation to support his child.

Id. at 146. One distinction that

the Borland Court would have had to resolve if it had considered
the issue of equitable estoppel in a case of this type is whether
equitable estoppel should be a complete bar as this defense is
generally considered, Mendez v. State, 813 P. 2d 1234 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), or under what circumstances in a paternity action it could
be a partial bar.4
As an alternative to Borland as support for his position,
appellee has cited Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974) and
Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976) .

However, neither

Baggs nor Wasescha was a paternity case where the State is a party.
Neither Baggs nor Wasescha is determinative of the issue before
this Court.

There is a clear distinction to be made in a paternity

action brought under the Uniform Paternity Act, Utah Code Ann. §
78-45a(l) et seq. where the State is a party.

Appellee may not

like nor appreciate the distinction, but it is significant.5

4

This is distinguishable from laches under Borland because the
circumstances were such that laches would have completely barred
the prosecution of that paternity action. Id. at 146.
5

For purposes of clarity to the court, the State has used the
term appellants without making any distinction between the State of
Utah, by and through Department of Social Services and ex rel.
Cathy Parker, however, this is for ease of reading by the court and
should by no means be interpreted to indicate that the State is
waiving the arguments outlined in its brief. Appellants' brief at
31-34.
9

An "ex rel." action is an action that is brought in the name
of the State but on information and at the instigation of a private
individual with a private interest in the outcome.

See Black's Law

Dictionary (5th ed. 1983).

Clearly Ms. Parker, as the custodial

parent

a private

of

the

twins, has

interest

in

the outcome;

however, the State, with its responsibilities under federal and
state law to the children has a separate and distinct role in this
matter.

Appellants' brief at 31-34.

This

Court

can

and

should

make

a determination

that

in

paternity actions, where the Uniform Act on Paternity provides that
the father's liability for education expenses and necessary support
are

limited

to

a

period

of

four

years

next

preceding

commencement of an action, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3

the

(1992), the

legislature has statutorily considered when a biological father has
an appropriate defense to a custodial mother's failure to pursue
child support.
In analysis, the ultimate statement that child support is not
wanted is made by not filing a paternity action.

This would seem

to indicate that the legislature intended § 78-45a-3 to be an antiestoppel provision to preclude estoppel as a defense to an action
under the Uniform Act on Paternity,

including claim

for child

support during that four year period before the action was filed.
POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTABLE BY
THE EVIDENCE AND THUS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The lower court

in its ruling

from the bench

felt that,

regarding the representation element of equitable estoppel, the
10

critical

factual

issue

was

whether

or

not

Ms.

Parker

statements claimed by Mr. Irizarry in three phone calls.
628.

made

R.627-

The lower court acknowledged that Ms. Parker denied making

any statements to Mr. Irizarry suggesting that she did not want
support from him for the children.

R.627-628.

The three phone calls referred to by the lower court in its
ruling were in the months of September 1984, November 1984 and
January 1985, all prior to the birth of the twins.
570.

R.566, 567,

Ms. Parker testified that she called Mr. Irizarry in November

1984 to tell him she was expecting twins.

R.452.

Ms. Parker

accepted the money that Mr. Irizarry sent her in November 1984.
R.56 9.

This evidence was not addressed

in the lower

court's

findings.
Additionally, after the January 1985 phone call, Mr. Irizarry
testified that he still thought he had a financial obligation to
the children.

R.572.

Thus, at worst, Ms. Parker's statements are

truthful that she did not ever say she did not want
support for the twins.
contrary,

Mr.

Irizarry

financial

If Ms. Parker did make statements to the
did

not

believe

and

rely

upon

those

statements.
Furthermore, the lower court findings ignore contacts Ms.
Parker testified she made after the children were born.
1.
In June 1985, she called Mr. Irizarry to tell him
that the children were born. She left the message with
a female roommate asking Mr. Irizarry to call her R.454,

11

573.6
2. In July 1985, Ms. Parker testified that she contacted
Mr. Irizarry at his father's home and they discussed the
twins and set up a meeting time for October 1985 to see
the twins. R.455. Mr. Irizarry denied any memory of
this phone call. R.574-576.
3.
In October 1985, Ms. Parker arrived to meet Mr.
Irizarry. The meeting never occurred but Ms. Parker did
take the children to the home of Andre Irizarry, (their
grandfather) to meet him. R.456. Mr. Irizarry testified
that he became aware of this meeting in February 1986
while living in Puerto Rico. R.456.
4. In October 1985, Ms. Parker went to Mr. Irizarry7s
father's home [looking for Mr. Irizarry]. R.456.
5.
In February 1987, Ms. Parker hired a private
investigator to find Mr. Irizarry. R.458-459, 473.
All

of

the above was

ignored

by

the

lower court

in its

findings and determination of estoppel in this case. This omission
resulted

in a finding that was clearly erroneous by the lower

court.
POINT III
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT DO NOT SUPPORT A DEFENSE
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IN THIS CASE.
All of the alleged contacts and statements relied upon by the
lower court were contacts and statements made before the birth of
the children and before any support accrued.

None of the cases

cited by appellee - Vrontikis, Borland, Baggs, and Wasescha - stand
for the proposition that representations made in connection with an
estoppel defense can be representations made prior to the birth of
6

Appellee is contesting the testimony wherein Ms. Parker left
a message asking Mr. Irizarry to call her.
This is actually
irrelevant whether Ms. Parker left the message asking Mr. Irizarry
to call since the crucial fact is that Ms. Parker made contact or
attempted to make contact with Mr. Irizarry.
12

the child or children.
there

is no

child

This Court can take judicial notice that

support

obligation

until

a child

is born.

Obviously, until the child or children are born, no obligation can
arise because there is a chance that the child or children will not
be born.

Additionally, no expenses such as those for birthing,

food, clothing, or shelter are incurred on behalf of the child
until the child is born.

This is a simple but very important

point.
Regarding
statements of
defense.

the reliance

element

injury and/or reliance

of estoppel, there are no
that

support

an estoppel

The lower court found:

...that Plaintiff [Ms. Parker] made statements, took
actions that led the Defendant
[Mr. Irizarry] to
reasonably conclude that she wanted nothing to do with
him and didn't want his support. In reliance upon that,
the Defendant got on with his life, got married, and
started a family and under those circumstances should not
be responsible for the payment of child support until May
30, 1989, when this complaint was filed...
R.630.
There is no nexus between Mr. Irizarry marrying his current
wife and having a family and the alleged statements of Ms. Parker
indicating that she did not want him in her life.

In other words,

there was no finding that, but for the alleged statements of Ms.
Parker, Mr.
family.

Irizarry would not have gotten married

and had a

In Larsen v. Larsen, 300 P.2d 596 (Utah 1956), the Court,

talking about reliance, stated,
Where the father's failure to make such payments was
induced by her representations or actions, and where as
a result of such representations or actions, the father
has been lulled into failing to make such payments and
then to changing his position which he would not have
13

done but for such representations, and that as a result
of such failure to pay and change in his conditions it
will cause him great hardship and injustice if she is
allowed to enforce the payment of such back installments,
she may be thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of
such back installments.
Id. at 598.
In this case, Mr. Irizarry started dating his current wife six
months before his and Ms. Parker's children were born.

He began

seriously dating her and talked about marriage one to two months
before the two children were born.

His current wife was pregnant

with their first child approximately three months after his and Ms.
Parker's children were born, and he was married to his current wife
approximately six months after the children were born.

R.593-594.

Furthermore, after the last of the three phone calls, the lower
court relied upon for its finding of reliance, R.627-628, Mr.
Irizarry felt he still had a financial obligation to the children.
R.572.

Based upon this evidence, there could be no finding by the

lower court that Mr. Irizarry would not have married and started a
family with his current wife had he known that he had a child
support obligation.
The injury alleged by appellee is injury based upon the fact
that he would owe back due child support if he was ordered to pay
it.

Appellants submit that this type of injury is present in every

case of this kind.

There is nothing special about the type of

injury asserted by Mr. Irizarry.
CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

this

Court

should

rule

that

estoppel should not have barred the trial court from making a
14

determination that Mr. Irizarry owes a child support obligation for
the pre-filing period of May 30, 1985, through May 30, 1989.

In

this regard, the case should be remanded to the lower court for an
entry

of

an

amended

judgment

against

Mr.

Irizarry

for

an

appropriate amount of child support for that time period.
Respectfully submitted this

/

day of April, 1994.

LINDA LUINBTRA
BILLY L. WALKER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Attorneys for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered two copies of
the foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief to the attorney for Appellee,
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY

78-45a-l

78-45-13. Interpretation and construction.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 14.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.

Cross-References. — Construction of statutes, Chapter 3 of Title 68.

CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-45a-l.
78-45a-2.
78-45a-3.
78-45a-4.
78-45a-5.
78-45a-6.
78-45a-6.5.
78-45a-7.
78-45a-8.

78-45a-L

Obligations of the father.
Enforcement.
Limitation on recovery from the
father.
Limitations on recovery from
father's estate.
Remedies.
Time of trial.
Paternity action — Jury trial.
Authonty for blood tests.
Selection of experts.

Section
78-45a-9.
78-45a-10.
78-45a-ll.
78-45a-12.
78-45a-13.
78-45a-14.
78-45a-15.
78-45a-16.
78-45a-17.

Compensation of expert wi
nesses.
Effect of test results.
Judgment.
Security.
Settlement agreements.
Venue.
Uniformity of interpretation.
Short title.
Operation of act.

Obligations of the father.

The father of a child that is or may be born outside of marriage is liable to
the same extent as the father of a child born within marriage, whether or not
the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy
and confinement and for the education, necessary support, and any funeral
expenses for the child. For purposes of child support collection, a child born
outside of marriage includes a child born to a married woman by a man other
than her husband if that paternity has been established.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1; 1990, ch.
245, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted
"outside of marriage" for "out of wedlock" in
both sentences and "within marriage" for "in
wedlock" in the first sentence, added "For purposes of child support collection" and the clause

beginning "if at the end in the second sentence, and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to 62A-11-332.
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
§ 78-45-1 et seq.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cause of action for support.
Custody rights.
— Acknowledgment of paternity.
Right to trial by jury.

ANALYSIS

Action for reimbursement.
—Collateral estoppel.
—Costs.
Action to establish paternity.
"^Attorney fees.
—Statute of limitations.
Tolling.

Action for reimbursement.
—Collateral estoppel.
Where, in a paternity action brought for reimbursement of money provided for the benefit
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of a child allegedly fathered by defendant, th e
district court found that the state was barre"
from asserting its claim by the doctrine of re*8

torily qualified plaintiffs during the period of
the child's minority. Szarak v. Sandoval 636
P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981).

against the child's mother for failure to answ^r
interrogatories, it was held that since the d#"
fendant's cause of action against the moth^r
was different from that of the state under tl*e
Uniform Act on Paternity, the issue involved
collateral estoppel, and because none of tl*e
tests to apply collateral estoppel had been me^
res judicata had no application to the caseState ex rel. State Dep't of Social Servs. vRuscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)-

Cause of action for support.
A minor child, via her guardian ad litem,
has standing to maintain a cause of action
against her father for support. Fauver v
Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
Custody rights.
—Acknowledgment of paternity.
Father who publicly acknowledged his paternity had right to custody of his illegitimate
child, second only to mother's right, so that it
was improper for juvenile court to dismiss petition for custody and thereby terminate father's
parental right without hearing to determine
whether he was fit and proper person. State ex
rel. Baby Girl M, 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d
1013, 45 A.L.R.3d 206 (1970).
Under § 78-45-4.1, a stepparent has the obligation of support to the same extent as a natural parent so long as the stepparent's marriage
to the natural parent continues. State ex rel.
J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990).

—Costs.
The Uniform Act on Paternity makes no pr°"
vision for an award of costs against the state i n
an action for reimbursement. State ex restate Dep't of Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 7^2
P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Action to establish paternity.
—Attorney fees.
This act makes no provision for awarding attorney fees to the mother in an action to esta^"
lish paternity. Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 8# 8
(Utah 1978), overruled on grounds, Borland vChandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987).

Right to trial by jury.
Since there is no inherent constitutional
right to a trial by jury in paternity proceeding!
\^ ^ ^j*2\fc *ssA Mwfe Vi&g&ta&sra Vras* -W&, ^ssv
vided for such a right by statute, the defen»
dant, a putative father, had no right to a trill
by jury. Hyatt v. Hill, 714 P.2d 299 (Utah
1986).

—Statute of limitations.
Tolling.
Any statute limiting the time within which a
paternity action must be commenced under th e
Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled for all statu*

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v. MitcheHIndigent Paternity Defendants' Right to CoUn"
sel, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 933.
Comment, Husband Notification for Ab0r"
tion in Utah: A Patronizing Problem, 19^6
Utah L. Rev. 609.
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HJ>^
Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility*
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Ju^1"
cial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah k.
Rev. 166.
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Ad0P"
tion of Uniform Child Support Guidelines i n
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859.
Brigham Young Law Review. — No^e'
J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights t 0
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law>
lS89B;iA3. L. Hev. 955.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastard*
§ 68.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 18.
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of putative father's promise to support or provide ftr
illegitimate child, 20 A.L.R.3d 500.
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 5H
A.L.R.4th 565.
m ^
Rights and obligations resulting frwjl
human artificial insemination, 83 A.L.R.4tti
295.
Admissibility or compellability of blood \
to establish testees nonpaternity for purpoitl
challenging testee's parental rights,
A.L.R.4th 572.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children
21.

682

UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY

78-45a-2

78-45a-2. Enforcement.
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same
or other proceedings:
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch.
245, § 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "putative father" in the first sentence and made
minor stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-

sions by Department of H u m a n Services,
§ 62A-1-111.
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties
of Department of Human Services in collecting
child support, § 62A-11-104.
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to
62A-11-332.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Right to counsel.

ANALYSIS

Estoppel and laches.
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Right to counsel.
—Indigent prisoners.
Blood tests.
Discretion of court.
Standard of proof.
—Preponderance of evidence.

—Indigent prisoners.

Estoppel and laches.
Under appropriate circumstances, laches
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v.
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987).
A paternity action brought six years after
the birth of the child was not barred by laches,
where defendant made no factual showing to
support his argument that he was prejudiced
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d
144 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Where child was conceived while mother was
_married to her first husband and born while
she was married to her second husband, the
child was legitimate whichever husband was
the father, and testimony by mother that disputed second husband's fatherhood and supported first husband's fatherhood would not
illegitimize the child and was properly admissible in paternity action against first husband.
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982).

Blood tests.
While due process does not require Utah to
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be
some complicated paternity suits in which the
risks of error would be high enough that the
presumption against the right to appointed
counsel would be overcome; given the availability and quality of the blood tests, there is
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Discretion of court.
Due process of law does not require t h a t all
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity
actions must always be appointed counsel;
whether due process requires the appointment
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discretion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d
1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Standard of proof.
—Preponderance of evidence.
The applicable standard of proof where paternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Note, Establishing
Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Stepparents—The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 74 et seq.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 32 et seq.

A.L.R. — Death of putative father as precluding action for determination of paternity
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188.
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bastardy proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685.
Necessity or propriety of appointment of independent guardian for child who is subject of
paternity proceedings, 70 A.L.R.4th 1033.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=»
30 et seq.

78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father.
The father's liability for past education and necessary support are limited to
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action.
History* L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3.
Cross-References. — Limitation of action

for support or maintenance of dependent children, § 78-12-22.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statute of limitations.
—Tolling.
While any statute limiting the time within
which a paternity action must be commenced
under the Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled

for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during
the child's minority, the amount of recovery of
child support is still limited by this section.
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Clark v. Jeter. Equal Protection Versus Statutes of Limitation in Paternity Actions, 15 J.
Contemp. L. 119 (1989).

Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 127.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <s=»
35.

78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate.
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are
limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be payable for dependency under other laws.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
act," as used in this section, means Laws 1965,
ch. 158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to
78-45a-17.

Cross-References. — Civil liability for support, Chapter 45 of this title.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 127.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=»
35
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78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Cummings v. Cummings, 175 Utah
Adv. Rep. 23 (Ct. App. 1991).

78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Watson v Watson, 194 Utah Adv.
Rep. 42 (Ct. App. 1992).

CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-45a-5.
78-45a-7

78-45a-5.

Section
78-45a-10.

Remedies.
Authontv for genetic testing.

Effect of genetic test results

Remedies.

(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All
remedies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for
legitimate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All
remedies under Title 77, Chapter 31, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available for enforcement of duties of support under this act.
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the
Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or in its
own behalf, pursuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, to enforce
that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the department,
the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, shall apply. Whenever the department commences an action under this act, it shall be the duty of the attorney
general or the county attorney of the county where the obligee resides to
represent the department.
(3) The court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness
fees in the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknowledgment of paternity.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, * 5; 1975, ch. 96,
$ 24; 1990, ch. 183, $ 60; 1992, ch. 160, $ 2;
1993, ch. 137, $ 16.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, in Subsection (1).
divided the former first sentence into two sentences, substituted "action to establish paternity" for "action under this act at the end of

the present first sentence, and added the title
and chapter citation to the reference in the last
sentence; in Subsection (2), substituted the reference to Title 62A, Chapter 11 for "Chapter
45b of this title"in the first and second sentences; designated the former last sentence of
Subsection (2) as Subsection (3) and substituted "the department commences an action
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under this act" for "a court action is commenced by the state Department of Human
Services'in that subsection: and made stylistic
changes throughout the section.

78-45a-10

The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993,
deleted the (3) designation formerly before the
present last sentence in Subsection (2) and
added present Subsection (3).

78-45a-6. Time of trial.
If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the pregnancy
of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be
held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such delay testimony may
be perpetuated according to the laws of this state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 6.
Cross-References. — Depositions before action, Rule 27, U.R.C.P
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
* 123.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 101.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children <s=>
55.

78-45a-6.5. Paternity action — Jury trial.
(1) Either party to an
jury trial to determine
(2) (a) The procedure
is the same as for
(b) The standard

action commenced under this chapter may demand a
paternity.
and law governing a trial by jury under this chapter
a civil jury trial in district court.
of proof is "by a preponderance of the evidence."

History: C. 1953, 78-45a-6.5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 93, § 1.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 93 be-

came effective on April 25, 1988. pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing,
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to delay
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, and the
alleged father to submit to genetic testing.
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative or upon request made by or on
behalf of any person whose blood is involved, order the mother, the child, and
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing.
(3) If any party refuses to submit to those tests, the court may resolve the
question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order if the rights
of others and the interests of justice so require.
ififffT^ L ' ^ ^ C h ' 1 5 8 ' * ? ; 1 9 9 2 ' C h '
160, $ 3.
Amendment iNotes. - The 1992 amendment effective July 1, 1992, added the subsectwn designations; divided the former first sen-

tenCe m t

° t W ° s e n t e n <*s, reversing their order
substituting "genetic testing" for "blood
tests" m both subsections and "request" for
"suggestion" in Subsection (2); and made stvlistic changes throughout the section.

and
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A.L.R. — Admissibility or compellability of
blood test to establish testee's nonpaternity for
purpose of challenging testees parental rights,
87 A.L.R.4th 572.

78-45a-10

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=»
45.

78-45a-8. Selection of experts.
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as examiners of blood types
who shall be appointed by the court. The experts shall be called by the court
as witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be subject to cross-examination by the parties. Any party or person at whose suggestion the tests have
been ordered may demand that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood
types, perform independent tests under order of court, the results of which
may be offered in evidence. The number and qualifications of such experts
shall be determined by the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 8.
Cross-References. — Blood test examiner
as witness, § 78-25-20.

Court appointment of expert witnesses. Rule
706, U.R.E.

78-45a-9. Compensation of expert witnesses.
The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the court shall be
fixed at a reasonable amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order. The
court may order that it be paid by the parties in such proportions and at such
times as it shall prescribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but
not appointed by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not
be taxed as costs in the action.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 9.
Cross-References. — Judgment and costs,
Rule 54, U.R.C.P.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 138.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=
75.

(1) If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by the
evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of
the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly.
(2) If the experts conclude that the genetic tests show the possibility of the
alleged fathers paternity, admission of that evidence is within the discretion
of the court.
(3) (a/ A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genetic
testing results in a paternity index of at least 100.
(b) A presumption under this subsection may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the court may receive testimony and genetic test results from genetic testing experts and others
involved in conducting the genetic tests in the form of an affidavit.
(b) If any party objects to the court's receipt of the testimony or test
results in affidavit form, that party may file a written objection with the
court. The objection shall be filed within 30 days after service of the
written test results on that party. Failure to timely file an objection under
this subsection constitutes a waiver of that objection.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10; 1992, ch.
160, § 4.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992. designated the
former first and third sentences as Subsections
(1) and (2), respectively; deleted the former second sentence which read: "If the experts dis-

agree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence";
substituted "genetic tests" for 'blood tests." deleted "depending upon the infrequency of the
blood type" from the end. and made a stylistic
change in Subsection (2); and added Subsections (3) and (4)
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Judgments under this act may be for periodic payments which may vary in
amount. The court may order payments to be made to the mother or to some
person, corporation, or agency designated to administer them under the supervision of the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1 1 .
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchhne following § 78-45a-4

Cross-References. — Income withholding,
§§ 62A-11-401 to 62A-11-414.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
* 127
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards * 111.

78-45a-12.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=»
67

Security,

The court may require the alleged father to give bond or other security for
the payment of the judgment.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 12.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur 2d Bastards
* 128
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards *> 118 et seq

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=»
70
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78-45a-13. Settlement agreements.
An agreement of settlement with the alleged father is binding only when
approved by the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 13.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am Jur 2d Bastards
§ 98 et seq
C.J.S. — 10 C J S Bastards § 40 et seq

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=»
33

78-45a-14. Venue.
An action under this act may be brought in the county where the alleged
father is present or has property or in the county where the mother resides.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 14.
Meaning of "this act" — See note under
same catchhne following § 78-45a-4

Cross-References. — Venue, general provisions, Chapter 13 of this title

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am Jur 2d Bastards
§ 76
C.J.S. — 10 C J S Bastards ^ 57 58

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children <s=>
37

78-45a-15. Uniformity of interpretation.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 15.
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of
"[t]his act," as used in this section see note
under same catchhne following § 78-45a-4
Uniform Laws. — Other jurisdictions

adopting the Uniform Act on Paternity are
Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island
Cross-References. — Construction of statutes, Chapter 3 of Title 68

78-45a-16. Short title.
This act shall be known and mav be cited as the "Uniform Act on Paternity."
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 16.
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of

'[t]his act," as used in this section, see note
under same catchhne following § 78-45a-4
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78-45a-17. Operation of act.
This act applies to all cases of birth out of wedlock as defined in this act
where birth occurs after this act takes effect.
The term "after this act takes effect" means
after the effective date of Laws 1965, ch. 158,
i.e., May 11, 1965.

History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 17.
Meaning of "this act." — As to meaning of
"[t]his act," appearing throughout this section,
see note under same catchline following
§ 78-45a-4.

CHAPTER 45b
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
(Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2; 1987, ch. 161, § 314; 1988, ch. 1, § 407.)

78-45b-l to 78-45b-25.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407 repeals
§§ 78-45b-l to 78-45b-6, as enacted by Laws
1975, ch. 96, § 1, Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 1, and
Laws 1985. ch. 8, § 2 and as amended by Laws
1987, ch. 77, § 3 and Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§§ 309 to 312. relating to common law remedies, definitions, support debt and hearings, effective January 19, 1988. For present comparable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-301 to
62A-11-308.
Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 314 repeals
§ 78-45b-6.1, as last amended by Laws 1983,
ch. 161, § 2, concerning findings in order by
department and judicial review, effective January 1, 1988.
Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407 repeals §§ 78-45b-7
to 78-45b-21, as enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 96,
§§ 7, 10, 12, 14 to 18, 20 and 21, Laws 1984
(S.S.), ch. 2, § 1 and Laws 1985, ch. 9, § 1 and
as amended by Laws 1977, ch. 145, § 8, Laws
1984, ch. 14, § 1, Laws 1984 (S.S.), ch. 2, § 2,

Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch. 151,
§ 313, relating to liens, final orders, payments
and charging all uncollectable support debts,
effective January 19, 1988. For present comparable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-309 to
62A-11-321.
Section 78-45b-22 (L. 1975, ch. 96, § 22), relating to inapplicability of statute of limitations to liens, wage assignment or garnishment, was repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2.
Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407 repeals §§ 78-45b-23
to 78-45b-25, as enacted by Laws 1984, ch. 13,
§ 5, Laws 1985, ch. 13, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch.
77, § 4, relating to medical and dental expenses of dependent children, providing court
debt information to consumer reporting agencies, and the information received from state
tax commissioner, effective January 19, 1988.
For present comparable provisions, see
§§ 62A-11-326 to 62A-11-328.

CHAPTER 45c
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION
Section
78-45c-l.
78-45c-2.
78-45c-3.
78-45c-4.

Purposes — Construction.
Definitions.
Bases of jurisdiction in this
state.
Persons to be notified and
heard.

Section
78-45c-5.
78-45c-6.
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Service of notice outside state
— Proof of service — Submission to jurisdiction.
Proceedings pending elsewhere
— Jurisdiction not exercised
— Inquiry to other state —
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EXPRESS

knowledge of intended use and affirmative and I Ex relatione /eks releyshiyowniy/. Upon relaactive consent thereto.
I tion or information.
Legal proceedings which are instituted by the
Express private trust See Trust
attorney general (or other proper person) in the
name and behalf of the state, but on the inforExpress repeal. Abrogation or annulment of premation and at the instigation of an individual
viously existing law by enactment of subsequent statute declaring that former law shall be I who has a private interest in the matter, are
said to be taken "on the relation" (ex relatione)
revoked or abrogated.
of such person, who is called the "relator."
Express republication. Occurs with respect to
Such a cause is usually entitled thus: "State ex
will when testator repeats ceremonies essential
rei Doe v. Roe."
to valid execution, with avowed intention of
In the books of reports, when a case is said
republishing will.
to be reported ex relatione, it is meant that the
reporter derives his account of it, not from
Express terms. Within provision that qualified
personal knowledge, but from the relation or
acceptance, in "express terms," vanes effect of
draft, "express terms" means clear, unambigu- | narrative of some person who was present at
ous, definite, certain, and unequivocal terms. I the argument.
I Ex rights. Literally, without rights. Stock sold
ex rights is sold without privileged subscription
rights to a current new issue by a corporation.

Express trust See Trust
Express warranty. See Warranty.

Expropriation. A taking, as under eminent do- | Ex tempore /eks tempariy/. From or in consemain. This term is also used in the context of a
quence of time; by lapse of time. Ex diuturno
foreign government taking an American industempore, from length of time. Without prepatry located in the foreign country. In Louisiration or premeditation.
ana, the word has the same general meaning as
Extend. Term lends itself to great variety of
eminent domain.
meanings, which must in each case be gathered
A voluntary surrender of rights or claims;
from context. It may mean to expand, enlarge,
the act of divesting oneself of that which was
prolong, lengthen, widen, carry or draw out
previously claimed as one's own, or renouncing
further than the original limit; e.g., to extend
it. In this sense it is the opposite of "approprithe time for filing an answer, to extend a lease,
ation.'f
term of office, charter, railroad track. See also
See also Condemnation; Eminent domain.
Extension; Renewal.
Expulsion. A putting or driving out. Ejectment;
banishment; a cutting off from the privileges of Extended. A lengthening out of time previously
fixed and not the arbitrary setting of a new
an institution or society permanently. The act
date. Stretched, spread, or drawn out.
of depriving a member of a corporation, legislative body, assembly, society, commercial or- j Extended coverage clause. Provision in insurganization, etc., of his membership in the same,
ance policy which carries protection for hazby a legal vote of the body itself, for breach of I ards beyond those covered in the basic policy.
duty, improper conduct, or other sufficient
See also Omnibus clause.
cause. Also, in the law of torts and of landlord
and tenant, an eviction or forcible putting out. i Extended insurance. An option to use dividend
See Deportation; Ejectment; Eviction; Expel;
to procure extended insurance is one to proForcible entry and detainer; Summary (Sumcure extension of term of insurance from date
mary process).
to which premiums have been paid, without
further payment.
Expunge. To destroy; blot out; obliterate;
erase; efface designedly; strike out wholly. I Extension. An increase in length of time (e.g. of
The act of physically destroying information— i expiration date of lease, or due date of note).
including criminal records—in files, computers,
Bankruptcy.
An extension proposal is an
or other depositories.
agreement on part of creditors that they will
Expungement of record. Process by which rec- , extend time within which their claims are probord of criminal conviction is destroyed or I ably to be paid, in full as to secured creditors,
sealed after expiration of time. See also Era- | on terms proposed by debtor and approved by
; court.
sure (Erasure of record).
Expurgation. The act of purging or cleansing, as I
where a book is published without its obscene
I
passages.
]
|
Expurgator. One who corrects by expurging.
Ex quasi contractu /eks kweysay kantraekchuw/.
J
From quasi contract.
I
Ex rei. See Ex relatione.
s\

Commercial law. An allowance of additional
time for the payment of debts. An agreement
between a debtor and his creditors, by which
they allow him further time for the payment of
his liabilities. A creditor's indulgence by giving
a debtor further time to pay an existing debt.
Lease. The word when used in its proper and
usual sense in connection with a lease, means a
prolongation of the previous leasehold estate.

